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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff7Appellee : 
KENNETH J. WEBSTER : Case No. 990764-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of wrongful appropriation of a 
vehicle, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-404.5 (Supp. 1998). See 
Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1996) which grants this Court authority to review appeals in criminal cases not 
involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1 A. Under the Confrontation Clause to the Federal Constitution, courts may only 
admit hearsay evidence if a firmly rooted hearsay exception applies or the evidence 
possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The hearsay statements admitted 
below, in which the declarant totally exonerated herself and solely blamed the defendant 
for the crime, did not fit a firmly rooted hearsay exception and were inherently unreliable. 
Did the trial judge err in admitting this evidence? 
Whether evidence is admissible under the Federal Constitution is a question of law 
which this Court reviews for correctness. State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 
1991). This issue is preserved at R. 38: 96-103, 113.l 
IB. Before the trial court may admit hearsay evidence under the residual 
exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent of the evidence must notify the opponent 
before trial to provide an opportunity to prepare to meet the evidence. Utah R. Evid. 
804(b)(5). The State notified the defense during the middle of trial of its intent to admit 
hearsay evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. Did the trial judge err in 
admitting this evidence when defense counsel relied on the absence of notice and claimed 
during opening statements that the State could not identify the perpetrator? 
This Court reviews the trial court's decision to admit evidence under a correctness 
standard. Provo City v. Warden. 844 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This issued is 
preserved at R. 22-23; R. 38: 97-98, 103, 113. 
1C. Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution promotes marital harmony and 
preserves marriages by barring the State from compelling a spouse to testify against the 
other spouse. The State presented hearsay evidence from a wife that solely blamed her 
xThe volume marked ffR. 38" contains the trial transcript. The internal page 
numbers of that volume are included after the volume number. 
2 
husband for a crime and that served as the only undisputed evidence of guilt. Did the 
admission of this divisive evidence violate the Utah Constitution by sowing marital 
dissension, just as if the wife had testified herself? 
Interpreting a constitutional provision is a question of law which this Court 
reviews for correctness. State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App. 45, ^  5, 975 P.2d 476. This 
issue is preserved at R. 38: 22-23, 52, 96-102, 113. 
2. Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) bars trial judges from admitting evidence of 
other crimes to show a criminal defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit 
bad acts. The trial judge below admitted evidence of a similar act that occurred seven 
years previously in Virginia and was totally unconnected to the alleged facts below. Did 
the trial judge abuse his discretion in admitting this evidence? 
This Court reviews the admission of evidence of prior bad acts for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, f 18, 993 P.2d 837. Trial counsel preserved 
this issue atR. 25-28; R. 38: 40-46, 91-94, 111. 
3. At the time of the offense, the legislature had not specified a punishment for the 
crime of wrongfully appropriating a motor vehicle under Utah Code Annotated section 
76-6-404.5(3)(e) (Supp. 1998). In such situations, Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-
105 (1999) punishes criminal offenses as infractions. Did the trial judge err in sentencing 
Mr. Webster for a third degree felony? 
Determining the penalty for a crime is a question of law which this Court reviews 
3 
for correctness. State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This issue 
is preserved at R. 42-43; R. 53: 5-15.2 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Addenda contain reprints of the following constitutional and statutory 
provisions: 
Addendum B: 
Addendum C: 
Addendum D: 
Addendum E: 
Addendum F: 
Addendum G: 
Addendum H: 
Addendum I: 
Addendum J: 
Addendum K: 
Addendum L: 
Addendum M: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5 (Supp. 1998) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-105 (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1311 (1998) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1999) 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI 
Utah Const., art. I, § 12 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5 (1999) 
Utah Rule of Evidence 804 
Utah Code Ann. §41-la-1314 (1998) 
Utah Const, art. I, § 18 
U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State filed an Information on July 29, 1998, charging Appellant Kenneth J. 
Webster with one count of theft. R. 1. On the day of trial, on April 29, 1999, Mr. 
Webster filed a motion to allow his wife, Elsha Gallegos, to assert her state constitutional 
2The volume marked "R. 53" contains the sentencing hearing transcript. The 
internal page numbers of that volume follow the volume number. 
4 
right not to testify against him. R. 22. He requested the trial judge to allow Ms. Gallegos 
to assert her right outside the jury's presence and to instruct the prosecutor not to 
comment on Ms. Gallegos' invocation of that right. R. 22-23. The prosecutor agreed not 
to call Ms. Gallegos to testify in front of the jury. R. 38: 39. 
Also on the first day of trial, Mr. Webster filed a motion in limine to prevent the 
State from introducing evidence that Mr. Webster had admitted to police that he had 
committed a similar offense in Virginia. R. 25. Similarly, Mr. Webster sought to prevent 
the prosecutor from presenting evidence of Mr. Webster's conviction for that conduct. R. 
27. The trial judge deferred ruling on these requests because he concluded that he could 
best determine the relevancy of the prior act evidence and its potential for prejudice after 
the State presented its case. R. 38: 46. Ultimately, he admitted the prior conviction 
because defense counsel had raised the perpetrator's identity during opening statements. 
R. 38: 93-94. 
After Ms. Gallegos invoked her right not to testify, the prosecutor requested the 
trial judge to admit Ms. Gallegos' statements through the police officer that heard them. 
R. 38: 96-97, 99-100. Although recognizing that Ms. Gallegos' statements as hearsay, the 
trial judge admitted them under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. R. 38: 102-03. 
The jury subsequently acquitted Mr. Webster of theft but convicted him of the 
lesser included offense of wrongful appropriation. R. 34-35; 38: 147; Addendum A. 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Webster filed a motion to clarify the penalty for the crime 
5 
of wrongfully appropriating a vehicle under Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-
404.5(3)(e) (Supp. 1998). R. 42. At the time of the offense, the legislature had repealed 
the statute that had defined the penalty for wrongfully appropriating a vehicle. R. 43. 
Because the legislature had failed to provide any penalty, Mr. Webster argued that the 
statutory provision that addresses this very scenario, Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-
105 (1999), required the trial judge to treat wrongfully appropriating a vehicle as an 
infraction. R. 38: 43. 
At sentencing, the trial judge concluded that subsection 3(a) under Utah Code 
Annotated 76-5-404.5 specified the punishment, not subsection 3(e). R. 53: 14. 
Subsection 3(a) imposes a third degree felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(a) 
(Supp. 1998). 
The trial judge sentenced Mr. Webster to 180 days in jail and suspended all but 
165 days of that term. R. 53: 20. The judge also placed Mr. Webster on court-supervised 
probation for 18 months, required him to perform 120 hours of community service, and 
ordered him to enroll in cognitive restructuring classes. R. 53: 20. In addition, the trial 
imposed a $750 fine and ordered Mr. Webster to pay $200 toward the costs of his court-
appointed attorney. R. 53: 20-21. Mr. Webster then filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 
60. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Trial Testimony 
On June 22, 1998, a customer traded in a 1988 Nissan Stanza at Intermountain 
Volkswagen. R. 38: 71. As was Intermountain's custom, the car was placed in a secured, 
fenced lot until a financial institution funded the loan supporting the transaction involving 
the trade in. R. 38: 62-63, 73. Intermountain would then recondition the car for resale or 
sell it to a wholesaler. R. 38: 70, 73. However, until the loan was funded, no one had 
permission to drive traded-in used cars. R. 38: 63. Once Intermountain obtained legal 
possession of used cars, salespersons had permission to test drive them. R. 38: 79-80. 
Intermountain kept the keys to newly-acquired used cars inside a sales trailer in the 
office of Mike McGuire who oversaw the reconditioning department. R. 38: 62-63, 70, 
76. At some unspecified time, the loan underlying the transaction involving the Nissan 
Stanza apparently was funded and Intermountain moved the keys to an unsecured box 
labeled "wholesale." R. 38: 78. All of Intermountain's 20 to 25 employees had access to 
the box. R. 38: 68-69. It is not clear from the record whether salespersons could test cars 
designated for wholesale. 
About the same time the Nissan Stanza was traded in, Mr. Webster began working 
as a salesperson at Intermountain. R. 38: 63, 80. A few days later, Mr. McGuire saw Mr. 
Webster driving the Nissan Stanza off of the dealership lot. R. 38: 80. Mr. McGuire 
testified at trial that he definitely witnessed this event on the Monday or Tuesday before 
7 
July 10, 1998, which would have been July 6 or 7, 1998. R. 38: 77, 79-80, 83-84. 
However, Mr. McGuire informed the police on July 10, 1998, that he saw Mr. Webster 
driving the car two weeks earlier on June 26, 1998. R. 38:81. In addition, the police 
report of the interview with Mr. McGuire specifically stated that Mr. McGuire saw Mr. 
Webster driving the car two weeks previously. R. 38: 88-89. For some unexplained 
reason, that statement was crossed out. R. 38: 89. 
Mr. McGuire testified further that he saw Mr. Webster driving the car two or three 
days after Mr. Webster began his employment. R. 38: 80-81. Mr. Webster began 
working at Intermountain about June 24, 1998. R. 38: 80-81. Moreover, it is undisputed 
that Intermountain inventoried the Nissan Stanza as being in stock on both July 1, and 
July 3, 1998. R. 38: 73. 
About July 10, 1998, Intermountain discovered that the Nissan Stanza was 
missing. R. 38: 78-79. On that date, an Intermountain manager drove to Mr. Webster's 
large apartment complex and found the car in the parking lot. R. 38: 107. The manager 
then called the police. R. 38: 107. 
Police Officer Michael Cupello contacted Mr. Webster at his apartment and asked 
if he had taken the vehicle. R. 38: 108. Mr. Webster denied even touching the car. R. 
38:109. Officer Cupello disbelieved Mr. Webster and arrested him. R. 38: 109. A 
search of the car revealed no personal belongings and the police took no fingerprints from 
it. R. 38: 115. In addition, the keys to the car were never recovered. R. 38: 79. 
8 
The Trial Judge's Rulings on the Hearsay and Prior Act Evidence 
On the day of trial, April 29, 1999, Mr. Webster filed a motion to allow his wife, 
Elsha Gallegos, to invoke her state constitutional right not to testify and to allow her to 
assert that right outside of the jury's presence. R. 22. The defense feared that the State 
would call Ms. Gallegos to testify about her statements to the police following Mr. 
Webster's arrest. In particular, Officer Cupello telephoned Ms. Gallegos and informed 
her that Mr. Webster denied even touching the car. R. 38: 112. Ms. Gallegos 
immediately responded, "He is lying.'1 R. 38: 113. According to Ms. Gallegos, Mr. 
Webster claimed that he had permission to drive the car. R. 38: 114. Ms. Gallegos 
admitted that "they both had been driving [the car] around" on July 8, 1998, two days 
before Mr. Webster's arrest. R. 38: 113-14. She thought Mr. Webster had returned the 
car on July 8 because Mr. Webster had quit his job at Intermountain on that date. R. 38: 
113-14. When Officer Cupello replied that Mr. Webster claimed not to have driven the 
car, Ms. Gallegos responded, "We have a problem." R. 38: 114. 
Also on the day of trial, defense counsel filed motions to prevent the prosecutor 
from either presenting evidence that Mr. Webster had committed a similar offense in 
Virginia or from allowing Officer Cupello to testify concerning Mr. Webster's statements 
about that offense. R. 25, 27. According to Officer Cupello, during the ride to the police 
station, he asked Mr. Webster if he had ever been arrested before. R. 38: 111. Mr. 
Webster admitted to being arrested in Virginia for "driving a vehicle off of a dealership 
9 
lot." R. 38: 112. Mr. Webster claimed in his motions that evidence of such a similar 
offense would unfairly prejudice the jury and would only serve to show bad character. R. 
25-28. 
Prior to opening statements, the trial judge addressed the motions. R. 38: 38. The 
prosecutor conceded that she intended to call Ms. Gallegos to testify during rebuttal but 
she agreed to do so outside the jury's presence. R. 38: 38-39. When the trial judge asked 
Ms. Gallegos if she planned to testify, she indicated that she wanted to wait to see how 
the trial proceeded. R. 38: 38-39. 
Following a recess, defense counsel indicated to the trial judge that Ms. Gallegos 
may not have understood her right not to testify. R. 38: 48-49, 51-52. The prosecutor 
explained that Ms. Gallegos informed her that she wanted to wait until after Mr. Webster 
presented his defense to decide whether to testify to prevent a possible "miscarriage of 
justice.1' R. 38: 49. The trial judge explained to Ms. Gallegos that she had an absolute 
right not to testify, that the right promoted marital harmony and trust, and that Ms. 
Gallegos should base her decision on her own interests and desires rather than her desire 
to reveal what she knew about the case. R. 38: 52. Ms. Gallegos then reiterated her 
wishes to defer a decision until after the presentation of the defense case. R. 38: 51-53. 
Concerning the motions to exclude evidence of prior bad acts, the prosecutor 
stated that she would not attempt to admit evidence of the prior conviction, but, rather, 
she only sought to admit Officer Cupello's testimony. R. 38: 39. The prosecutor claimed 
10 
that she needed the officer's statements to establish that Mr. Webster "intended to take the 
car" and "that it was [not] accidentally at his house." R. 38: 41. 
Defense counsel strenuously objected to the admission of this evidence. He 
argued that intent was not at issue because the State could not prove who actually placed 
the car in the apartment complex parking lot. R. 38: 43-44. Even if the State could 
establish identity, defense counsel contended that the prior offense did not address Mr. 
Webster's intent in this case because that crime occurred in Virginia "at some undisclosed 
time" and it was completely separate from the present charge. R. 38: 43. Defense 
counsel reasoned that admitting Mr. Webster's statements simply risked the "possibility 
or even a probability that the[] [jury] would want to find him guilty for his past acts, 
rather than based on the evidence that is brought before the court today." R. 38: 43. 
Defense counsel suggested that the trial judge defer ruling on the motion to 
exclude Officer Cupello's testimony until the State presented its case. R. 38: 45-46. 
Although the trial judge indicated that he was inclined to admit the evidence to show 
absence of mistake or intent, he agreed to defer his decision. R. 38: 46. 
During opening statements, defense counsel represented to the jury that the State 
could not show "who drove the car to the place where the car was found." R. 38: 58. 
Specifically, defense counsel claimed that the State had no physical evidence linking the 
car to Mr. Webster. R. 38: 58-59. Instead, the State could only show that the police 
found the car in a public parking lot. R. 38: 58-59. 
11 
The State then presented its case detailing Intermountain's procedures in handling 
trade-ins and how it discovered that the Nissan Stanza was missing. Following this 
testimony, the trial judge revisited the motion to exclude the evidence of Mr. Webster's 
prior offense. The prosecutor argued that the evidence was necessary because the State 
had no other evidence to prove Mr. Webster's intent, knowledge and lack of mistake. R. 
38: 91-92. In addition to repeating his earlier objections, defense counsel argued that Mr. 
Webster's mere statement about a prior offense lacked probative value without knowing 
any details about the crime such as when the offense occurred. R. 38: 92-93. 
The trial judge ruled that "given [defense counsel's] opening statement," Mr. 
Webster's prior offense was relevant. R. 38: 93. Moreover, the trial judge concluded that 
its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effects. R. 38: 93-94. 
The prosecutor then informed the trial judge that she intended to call Ms. Gallegos 
to testify. R. 38: 96. For the first time, the prosecutor indicated that if Ms. Gallegos 
invoked her right not to testify, the prosecutor would request the trial judge to admit Ms. 
Gallegos' hearsay statements through Officer Cupello. R. 38: 96-97. When the trial 
judge asked Ms. Gallegos about her wishes, she declined to testify. R. 38: 99. 
The prosecutor contended that the trial judge could admit Ms. Gallegos' statements 
to Officer Cupello under Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), the residual exception to the 
hearsay rule. R. 38: 97. According to the prosecutor, Ms, Gallegos' statements were 
trustworthy because she admitted, against her penal interest, that she drove with Mr. 
12 
Webster in a stolen vehicle. R. 38: 100-01. The prosecutor claimed that although Ms. 
Gallegos would not testify in front of the jury, she was willing to inform the trial judge 
exactly what she told Officer Cupello. R. 38: 97, 100-01. 
Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor failed to give him the required notice 
under Rule 804(b)(5) that she would seek to introduce Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements. 
R. 38: 97. Instead, defense counsel stated that Ms. Gallegos had consistently informed 
him that she would not testify. R. 38: 97-98. He also prepared his defense and made his 
opening statement "under the assumption that [the evidence]... doesn't fit under any of 
the established" exceptions to the hearsay rule. R. 38: 97-98. 
Defense counsel further asserted that Ms. Gallegos' statements did not affect her 
penal interests because she claimed that she did not know that Mr. Webster did not have 
permission to use the car. R. 38: 102. He also noted that the statements did not satisfy 
any other hearsay exception and that the residual exception wasn't "designed to let any 
type of hearsay in" when other exceptions did not apply. R. 38: 100. Rather, the key to 
that exception was trustworthiness. R. 38: 100. Finally, defense counsel asserted that 
admitting Ms. Gallegos' statements would effectively deprive Mr. Webster of his right to 
confront and cross-examine Ms. Gallegos. R. 38: 103. 
The trial judge ruled that because Ms. Gallegos' made the statements to a police 
officer, they were "proper" and reliable. R. 38: 102. In so ruling, the judge concluded 
that "[i]t is pretty clear that the rule allows this type of evidence to be admitted." R. 38: 
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103. The trial judge reasoned that either Ms. Gallegos uttered the statements against her 
penal interests or she innocently and dispassionately related facts that had "no particular 
impact one way or the other." R. 38: 102. In construing the evidence as "mere 
statements of inconsequential events," the trial judge deemed the statements trustworthy 
because there was "no reason she would say one way or the other." R. 38: 102-03. 
Concerning notice, the trial judge ruled that Rule 804(b) did not require the State to 
specify the method by which it would seek to introduce the evidence as long as the 
defense knew beforehand that the State wanted to admit Ms. Gallegos' statements. R. 38: 
98, 103. 
Following the trial judge's rulings, Officer Cupello testified concerning Ms. 
Gallegos' hearsay statements and Mr. Webster's admission to committing a prior offense. 
R. 38:110-14. The State and the defense then rested. R. 38:117-18. 
The trial judge instructed the jury on the crime of theft zmd the lesser included 
offense of wrongful appropriation. R. 38: 123-24; R. 29: 5.3 The relevant jury instruction 
defined wrongful appropriation as exercising "unathorized control [over a n ] . . . operable 
motor vehicle" with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of possession. R. 29: 5. 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor relied heavily on Officer Cupello's 
testimony concerning Mr. Webster's admission to committing a prior offense and 
3The volume marked R. 29 contains the jury instructions. The individual 
instructions are numbered after the volume number. 
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Ms. Gallegos' incriminating comments. R. 38: 131-33. Defense counsel cautioned the 
jury not to conclude that Mr. Webster was guilty simply because he previously committed 
a similar offense. R. 38: 137-38. In addition, he contended that the State failed to 
establish that Ms. Gallegos' correctly identified the car that she and her husband drove as 
the missing Nissan Stanza. R. 38: 139. 
The jury acquitted Mr. Webster of theft but convicted him of the lesser included 
offense of wrongful appropriation. R. 38: 147; Addendum A. 
Sentencing 
On July 22, 1999, Mr. Webster filed a motion to clarify the punishment for the 
crime of wrongful appropriation of a vehicle. R. 42. In his motion, Mr. Webster 
explained that under subsection 3(e) of the wrongful appropriation statute, "'an act of 
unauthorized control of motor vehicles . . . which does not constitute theft is punishable 
under [Utah Code Annotated] Section 41 -1 a-1311.'" R. 42-43 (quoting Utah Code 
Annotated section 76-6-404.5 (Supp. 1998)). However, effective May 4, 1998, just two 
months before Mr. Webster's arrest, the legislature repealed section 41-la-1311. R. 43; 
Utah Code Ann. §41-1 a-1311 (1998). Mr. Webster argued that when the legislature fails 
to specify a punishment for an offense, Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-105(2) 
requires the trial court treat the offense as an infraction. R. 43-44. 
At sentencing on August 24, 1999, the trial judge stated that he had not read Mr. 
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Webster's motion to clarify the punishment because he failed to notice it under the 
presentence report. R. 53: 5. Defense counsel, accordingly, reiterated his arguments in 
support of treating Mr. Webster's offense as an infraction. R. 53: 5-6. Alternatively, 
defense counsel argued that the trial judge should impose an A misdemeanor as provided 
under section 41-1 a-1311 prior to its repeal. R. 53: 6-7. 
The State countered that Mr. Webster was originally charged with theft of a motor 
vehicle which is punishable as a second degree felony under Utah Code Annotated 
section 76-6-412(l)(a)(ii). R. 53: 9; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(l)(a)(ii) (1999). When 
a person has been charged with a second degree felony under that subsection but the jury 
convicts the defendant of the lesser included offense of wrongful appropriation, 
subsection 3(a) of the wrongful appropriation statute punishes the offense as a third 
degree felony. R. 53: 9-10; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(a) (Supp. 1998). 
Defense counsel explained that subsection 3(e) of section 76-6-404.5 prevailed 
over subsection 3(a) because it specifically applied to '"an act of unauthorized control of 
[a] motor vehicle[].'M R. 53: 10-13 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(e) (Supp. 
1998)). In contrast, subsection 3(a) generally addressed several theft offenses, only one 
of which involved theft of a vehicle. R. 53: 11. In any event, defense counsel noted that 
under Utah law the lesser penalty prevailed over the greater. R. 53: 11. According to 
defense counsel, viewing the statutory scheme as a whole and applying the specific 
statutory provision over the general compelled the conclusion that subsection 3(e) 
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applied. R. 53: 10-13. 
The trial judge disagreed. He reasoned that defense counsel had erroneously 
equated "'unauthorized control'" of a vehicle under subsection 3(e) with the crime of 
"'wrongful appropriation.'" R. 53: 13-14 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5 (Supp. 
1998)). The judge apparently failed to recognize that section 76-6-404.5 defines the 
crime of wrongful appropriation as exercising "unauthorized control" over the property of 
another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(1) (Supp. 1998). Based on this 
misunderstanding, the trial judge imposed a third degree felony under subsection 3(a). 
The trial judge sentenced Mr. Webster to 180 days in jail and suspended all but 
165 days of that term. R. 53:20. He also placed Mr. Webster on court-supervised 
probation for 18 months, required him to perform 120 hours of community service, and 
ordered him to enroll in cognitive restructuring classes. R. 53: 20. In addition, the trial 
judge imposed a $750 fine and ordered Mr. Webster to pay $200 toward the costs of his 
court-appointed attorney. R. 53: 20-21. This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The admission of Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements violated Mr. Webster's right to 
confront and cross-examine her. Ms. Gallegos' statements that solely blamed Mr. 
Webster for the crime neither satisfied a firmly rooted hearsay exception nor were they 
otherwise trustworthy. Statements that exonerate the declarant and solely accuse another 
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are inherently unreliable. Even if the trial judge correctly construed the statements as 
factual observations, those statements did not possess sufficient indicia of reliability to be 
admitted. 
In any event, the trial judge erroneously admitted the statements under the residual 
hearsay exception because the prosecutor failed to notify defense counsel of her intent to 
apply the exception. The lack of notice harmed the defense because that omission caused 
defense counsel to represent to the jury that the State could not prove who took the car. 
When the State admitted Ms. Gallegos' statements accusing Mr. Webster of taking the 
car, both defense counsel and Mr. Webster appeared to have lied to the jury. 
Admitting Ms. Gallegos' incriminating statements also undermined the Utah 
constitutional right not to testify against the other spouse. Utah is the only state in the 
nation that provides such constitutional protection to spouses. The framers of the Utah 
Constitution established that right in response to the federal government's repugnant 
practice of imprisoning polygamous wives who refused to testify against their husbands. 
The right promotes marital harmony and preserves family relationships by allowing 
spouses to avoid having to testify against their mates and sending them to prison. 
However, when the State admits a spouse's hearsay statements that incriminate the other 
spouse, the source of the information remains the spouse. Thus, admitting such hearsay is 
the functional equivalent of spousal testimony. Because the spouse's statements may 
result in convicting the other spouse, marital dissension results. These concerns forbid 
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the admission of a spouse's hearsay statements when the spouse refuses to testify. 
The trial judge abused his discretion in admitting evidence of a prior offense. Mr. 
Webster's prior offense in Virginia had no connection to the matter below and it occurred 
seven years previously. The trial judge failed to consider the remoteness of the prior 
conviction or to inquire into the circumstances surrounding it. Because that offense was 
so similar to the present matter, its prejudicial effects significantly outweighed its 
probative value. That evidence simply served to bias the jury against Mr. Webster. 
Because the legislature had repealed the statute that listed the penalty for Mr. 
Webster's particular offense, Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-105(2) (1999) required 
the trial judge to impose an infraction. The rule of lenity demands that criminal 
defendants be given the benefit of the doubt in such situations. Further, the prohibition 
against ex post facto laws barred the trial judge from imposing a sentence higher than an 
infraction. At the very least, the trial judge could have only imposed an A misdemeanor 
as under the former statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. IN ADMITTING MS. GALLEGOS' HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS WITHOUT NOTICE TO THE DEFENSE, 
THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED MR. WEBSTER'S 
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION, GUTTED THE 
DEFENSE CASE UNFAIRLY, AND VIOLATED THE 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY 
AGAINST A SPOUSE 
The trial judge erred in admitting Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements for three 
separate reasons. First, because Ms. Gallegos' self-serving, exculpatory statements did 
not satisfy a firmly rooted hearsay exception and otherwise lacked trustworthiness, 
admitting them violated Mr. Webster's constitutional right to confront and cross-examine 
his accusers. Second, the trial judge erroneously admitted the statements under the 
residual hearsay exception because the State's notice of its intent to apply the exception 
during the middle of trial unfairly blind-sided the defense. Third, admitting Ms. 
Gallegos' incriminating statements undermined the Utah constitutional right not to testify 
against the other spouse because her statements created marital dissension just as if she 
had testified herself. 
A. Admitting Ms. Gallegos' Self-Serving, Hearsay Statements 
Violated Mr. Webster's Confrontation Rights 
Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements, absolving herself of all responsibility for the 
missing car and solely blaming Mr. Webster for taking it, lacked trustworthiness. Even 
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accepting those statements as mere factual assertions, the statements lacked sufficient 
reliability to admit them under the Confrontation Clause. Because the State presented no 
other evidence establishing that Mr. Webster drove the car without permission, the 
admission of Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements severely harmed the defense and requires 
reversal. 
1. Neither the Residual Exception to 
the Hearsay Rule Nor the 
Exception for Statements Against 
Penal Interests are Firmly 
Rooted Exceptions to the 
Hearsay Rule 
Both the Federal and Utah Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to 
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against them. U.S. Const., Amend. 6; Utah 
Const., art I, § 12; State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981). This right promotes 
reliability and truth-finding in criminal trials, and its absence "calls into question the 
ultimate 'integrity of the fact-finding process.'" Chambers v. Mississippi. 410 U.S. 284, 
295 (1973) (quoting Berger v. California. 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969)) (original citation 
omitted). In short, "'the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and 
fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional 
goal.5" Lee v. Illinois. 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (quoting Pointer v. Texas. 380 U.S. 400, 
405 (1965)). 
Because hearsay statements deprive criminal defendants of the right to confront 
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and cross-examine their accusers, courts may only admit hearsay if the declarant is 
unavailable and the evidence "bear[s] sufficient indicia of reliability." Brooks. 638 P.2d 
at 539 (citing Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). Courts may, however, infer 
reliability if: (1) "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception;" or, (2) the 
evidence possesses "particular guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 
56, 66 (1980) (fn. omitted). 
The trial judge wrongly admitted Ms. Gallegos' statements under the residual 
exception to the hearsay rule because that exception is not firmly rooted. For a hearsay 
exception to be firmly rooted, courts and legislatures must have had "longstanding . . . 
experience in assessing the trustworthiness of certain types of out-of-court statements." 
Idaho v. Wright. 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990). Because the residual hearsay exception 
involves "ad hoc" determinations of trustworthiness, it does not possess the necessary 
tradition of reliability. Id. 
The trial judge also indicated that Ms. Gallegos' statements may satisfy the 
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. But, a statement "laying sole 
responsibility" for a crime on another "cannot satisfy a firmly rooted hearsay exception." 
Lilly v. Virginia. 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1905 (1999) (Rehnquist, J., concurring and endorsing 
plurality's view). Rather, courts have traditionally viewed such self-serving statements 
with suspicion. Lee v. Illinois. 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986). 
Ms. Gallegos' claim that Mr. Webster took the car and that she knew nothing 
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about the car's misappropriation was just such a statement. When first asked about the 
car, Ms. Gallegos immediately asserted that Mr. Webster was "lying" and that she knew 
nothing about the alleged theft. R. 38: 113. Instead, she completely absolved herself of 
responsibility and shifted the entire blame to her husband. Ms. Gallegos5 statements 
exonerating herself and shifting complete responsibility to Mr. Webster are a prototypical 
example of the kind of self-serving statements that courts deem unreliable. Lilly v. 
Virginia, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1897-98, 1905 (1999).4 
2. The Statements Lacked Sufficient 
Guarantees of Trustworthiness 
Because Ms. Gallegos totally exonerated herself and shifted the sole blame to Mr. 
Webster, her statement also lacked sufficient "guarantees of trustworthiness.ff Roberts, 
448 U.S. at 66. When the police investigate a person for possible involvement in criminal 
activity with another, that person has "'strong motivation to implicate the defendant and 
to exonerate himself [or herself]."1 Lee, 476 U.S. at 541 (quoting Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968)). "[Statements made in an obvious attempt to curry 
favor with the authorities by inculpating defendant and exculpating declarant, lack 
trustworthiness." State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (fh. omitted). 
4
 Although Lilly did not produce a majority opinion, at least seven of the justices 
agreed that statements exonerating oneself and blaming another are untrustworthy. 119 
S.Ct. at 1897-98 (Stewart, J. plurality opinion), 1905 (Rehnquist, J. concurring). 
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These principles apply with particular force to this case. Ms. Gallegos had "strong 
motivation" to shift the blame because she admitted to Officer Cupello that "both" she 
and Mr. Webster had driven the car. R. 38: 114. Moreover, Ms. Gallegos fully 
appreciated the seriousness of her accusations as evidenced by her conclusion "We have a 
problem." R. 38: 114 (emphasis added). 
The trial judge reasoned that the statements were trustworthy because Ms. 
Gallegos' made them to a police officer. R. 38: 102. Just the opposite is true. When the 
police interview persons who are possible suspects in a crime, those persons have 
"'strong motivation'" to lie and to implicate others. Lee, 476 U.S. at 541 (quoting 
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 141). Statements made under these circumstances are "presumptively 
suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination." Id. 
As additional support, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that police reports of 
witness statements do not satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule. State 
v. Bertul 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983). Because such reports rely on memory, 
perception, and the reporter's motives, they "raise a serious question of reliability." Id. 
The Supreme Court concluded that "statements by witnesses to a crime and recorded by 
officers . . . do not have the indicia of reliability" necessary to satisfy the business records 
exception. IdL If written witness statements to police lack reliability, certainly a police 
officer's memory of a witness's oral statements also lack trustowrthiness. 
The trial judge also claimed that Ms. Gallegos' statements were trustworthy 
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because they were factual assessments that had "no particular impact one way or the 
other." R. 38: 102. No reasonable view of the evidence supports this conclusion. Ms. 
Gallegos lodged her allegations to a police officer knowing that her husband was in police 
custody and had been accused of stealing the car. After admitting that she drove and used 
the car with her husband, she accused Mr. Webster of lying and she shifted the entire 
responsibility to him. Likewise, her statement that "We have a problem" demonstrates 
that she fully understood the implications of her statements. Under these circumstances, 
the trial judge could not have reasonably viewed Ms. Gallegos' statements as 
"inconsequential" factual observations. R. 38: 103. 
Even if the trial judge properly could do so, Ms. Gallegos' statements did not 
possess sufficient "guarantees of trustworthiness" to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). In determining whether to admit hearsay 
evidence under the Confrontation Clause, courts must presume that hearsay lacks 
trustworthiness. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990). Courts may then only admit 
hearsay if "an affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement 
was made, provides a basis for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not 
worthy of reliance." Id at 821. To withstand constitutional scrutiny, the hearsay 
evidence also "must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception." Id. In other words, the evidence must contain sufficient guarantees 
of trustworthiness to render cross-examination "of marginal utility." Id. at 820. 
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Ms. Gallegos' statements fail to satisfy these stringent standards. First, instead of 
presuming Ms. Gallegos5 hearsay statements lacked reliability, the trial judge assumed 
that they were reliable because she made them to the police. R. 38: 102. The judge 
eliminated any doubt that he failed to appreciate the inherent unreliability of hearsay by 
concluding that "[i]t is pretty clear that the [the residual hearsay exception] allows this 
type of evidence to be admitted." R. 38: 103. 
Second, viewing Ms. Gallegos' statements as ordinary factual assertions does not 
satisfy any recognized hearsay exception. Instead, that evidence was ordinary hearsay 
that embodied all of the concerns associated with admitting second-hand information 
without the scrutiny of cross-examination. 
Third, the trial judge erroneously relied on extraneous evidence in admitting the 
statements. In determining the reliability of hearsay, the judge must limit the inquiry to 
"the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement." Wright, 497 U.S. at 820. 
In this case, the prosecutor persuaded the trial judge that the evidence was reliable 
because he claimed that Ms. Gallegos had agreed to verify her statements outside the 
jury's presence. The Confrontation Clause bars courts from relying on corroboration in 
determining the reliability of hearsay. Id at 822-23; State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 
1053-54 (Utah 1991). 
Fourth, given the circumstances of Ms. Gallegos' statements, cross-examination 
was essential. Wright. 497 U.S. at 820. Ms. Gallegos' blame-shifting comments raise a 
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host of questions about her knowledge and intent in using the car and her motives in 
speaking to Officer Cupello. Moreover, Ms. Gallegos' admission that she used the car 
required follow-up inquiries about whether Mr. Webster explained the terms of his 
allowed use of the car, whether she had permission to use the car herself, and why she did 
not question Mr. Webster about using the car other than for a test-drive. Moreover, if she 
believed that Mr. Webster had returned the car on July 8, 1998, why didn't she noticed it 
in the parking lot for two days. Too many reasonable questions surrounded Ms. 
Gallegos' statements for them to be admitted absent cross-examination. 
Thus, even characterizing Ms. Gallegos' statements as simple factual observations 
fails to supply the necessary guarantees of trustworthiness to admit them without 
violating the Confrontation Clause. Roberts. 448 U.S. at 66. 
3. Ms, Gal legos' Hearsay 
Statements Irrefutably Harmed 
the Defense 
Because Ms. Gallegos' statements provided the only evidence of the perpetrator's 
identity and intent, admitting those statements severely harmed the defense. This Court 
declares federal constitutional error harmless only when the error was "'harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'" State v. GenovesL 909 P.2d 916, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(quoting Scott v. State, 465 P.2d 620, 622 (Nev. 1970)). Because the remaining evidence 
did not establish who took the car and why that person did so, Ms. Gallegos' statements 
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were determinative in convicting Mr. Webster. 
The State produced no physical evidence connecting Mr. Webster to the car. The 
police found no personal belongings in the car, nor did they obtain any fingerprints from 
it. Mr. Webster did not possess the keys to the car, and, in fact, the police never located 
them. 
The only other evidence the State presented that Mr. Webster used the car was Mr. 
McGuire's testimony. The evidence indicates, however, that Mr. McGuire only saw Mr. 
Webster driving the car while Mr. Webster remained employed at Intermountain and 
when he likely had permission to use the car. Mr. McGuire informed the police that he 
saw Mr. Webster in the car on June 26, 1998, four days after the car was traded in. R. 38: 
81. The police report of Mr. Webster's arrest lends further support to this date because it 
indicated that Mr. McGuire told the police he saw Webster two weeks before July 10, 
1998. R. 38: 88-89. For some unexplained reason, the police crossed out that 
information. R. 38: 89. 
Consistent with this information, Mr. McGuire testified that he saw Mr. Webster 
driving the car two or three days after Mr. Webster began his employment on June 24, 
1998. R. 38: 80. Moreover, Intermountain inventoried the Nissan Stanza as being in 
stock on both July 1, and July 3, 1998. R. 38: 73. 
Although the evidence did not indicate whether salespersons could test cars 
designated for wholesale, Mr. McGuire surely would have objected to Mr. Webster 
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driving such a car if Mr. Webster had acted inappropriately. The only logical inference 
that could be drawn from Ms. McGuire's testimony is that Mr. Webster drove the car on 
June 26, 1998 when he had permission to do so. 
Given this inconclusive evidence, the admission of Ms. Gallegos' statements 
leveled a fatal blow to the defense. Only her statements showed Mr. Webster driving the 
car without permission. Admitting hearsay evidence particularly harms the defendant 
when, as here, the State uses it as "substantive evidence" to convict the defendant. Lee v. 
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 542 (1986). Because Ms. Gallegos' statements served as the only 
substantive evidence of guilt, the admission of that evidence requires reversal Id. 
B. The Prosecutor Severely Harmed the Defense in Failing to 
Give Adequate Notice of Her Intent to Admit the Hearsay 
Evidence 
The trial judge further erred in admitting Ms. Gallegos' statements because the 
prosecutor unfairly sabotaged the defense when she waited until the middle of trial to 
notify the defense of her intent to admit the statements under the residual hearsay 
exception. This Court generally reviews the trial court's decision to admit evidence for 
correctness. State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 613 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). To obtain 
admission of hearsay under the residual exception, the party seeking admission must not 
only establish trustworthiness but also provide the opposing party notice prior to trial of 
an intent to admit the evidence: 
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[A] statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars 
of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5). 
The prosecutor first requested to admit Ms. Gallegos' statements under the residual 
exception after Ms. Gallegos invoked her right not to testify and after the prosecutor had 
presented the evidence establishing the factual context of the case. Thus, the prosecutor 
plainly failed to provide Mr. Webster notice "sufficiently in advance of the trial" of her 
intent to apply the residual exception. Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5). 
• This late notification deprived Mr. Webster of a "fair opportunity to prepare to 
meet" Ms. Gallegos' allegations. Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5). The trial judge concluded that 
Mr. Webster had fair notice of the prosecutor's intentions because the defense knew 
before trial that the State wanted to call Ms. Gallegos to the stand. But, the trial judge 
failed to appreciate the severe harm the lack of notice caused the defense. Throughout the 
proceedings, defense counsel had communicated with Ms. Gallegos and assured himself 
that she would not testify. Defense counsel was so satisfied that Ms. Gallegos would not 
testify that he filed a pretrial motion requesting the trial judge to allow Ms. Gallegos to 
invoke her right not to testify outside the jury's presence. Defense counsel also properly 
concluded that no other hearsay exceptions supported admitting Ms. Gallegos' 
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statements. He then planned his defense accordingly. 
Relying on his belief that the prosecutor could not admit Ms. Gallegos' statements, 
defense counsel argued during opening statements that the State could not establish "who 
drove the car to the place where the car was found." R. 38: 58. Defense counsel also 
emphasized the lack of physical evidence linking Mr. Webster to the car and he noted 
further the absence of any witnesses who saw Mr. Webster park the car in the apartment 
complex parking lot. R. 38: 58-59. 
When the trial judge admitted those statements anyway, defense counsel was not 
prepared to rebut them. Instead, he could only claim in closing arguments that Ms. 
Gallegos hearsay statements did not conclusively establish that the car she and Mr. 
Webster had used was the same one missing from Intermountain. R. 38: 139. In contrast, 
the State heavily relied on Ms. Gallegos' statements during closing arguments to establish 
the critical elements of the offense of identity and intent to deprive. R. 38: 131-33. 
The prosecutor's failure to adequately notify the defense devastated the defense 
case. Once the State admitted Ms. Gallegos' statements in the middle of trial, the jury 
could have only concluded that defense counsel lied during opening arguments. 
Likewise, the jury likely concluded that Mr. Webster lied when he told the police that he 
had not even touched the car. The hearsay evidence destroyed the defense's credibility 
and established the essential elements of the crime of wrongful appropriation. 
Had the defense known the State planned to admit the hearsay statements under 
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the residual exception it likely would have prepared .for trial much differently. The 
defense may have entered plea negotiations with a different perspective. It might have 
also reevaluated whether to oppose Ms. Gallegos' testimony, or, alternatively, to try to 
impeach her credibility. Instead, given the lack of notice, defense counsel could only 
argue unpersuasively that the State failed to prove that the car that Ms. Gallegos and Mr. 
Webster used was not the missing Nissan Stanza. It should also be remembered that the 
trial judge based his decision to admit evidence of Mr. Webster's prior offense on defense 
counsel's opening statement that the State could not prove the perpetrator's identity. The 
lack of notice, thus, had huge implications for the defense. 
The notice requirement is designed to avoid these precise problems. Because the 
prosecutor failed to notify the defense before trial of her intent to apply the residual 
exception, the defense was not Mprepare[d] to meet" the State's case in violation of Rule 
of Evidence 804(b)(5). 
C. The Trial Judge Violated the Utah Constitutional Right 
Against Compelled Spousal Testimony When He Admitted 
Ms, Gallegos' Hearsay Statements After She Invoked That 
Right 
Admitting Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements violated the spousal right not to 
testify against the other spouse as guaranteed under Utah Constitution, Article I, section 
12. That provision states in relevant part that "a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
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against her husband, nor a husband against his wife." Addendum G. Identical provisions 
are contained in Utah Code Annotated section 77-l-6(2)(d) (1999) and Utah Rule of 
Evidence 502(a). Although Ms. Gallegos did not testify against Mr. Webster, the trial 
judge's admission of her hearsay statements were the functional equivalent of spousal 
testimony. 
The right of a spouse not to testify dates back to medieval common law. Trammel 
v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980). Traditionally, the common law barred a wife 
from testifying, at all, for or against her husband. Id. Today, spouses may testify on 
behalf of or against the other spouse but the witness spouse holds the privilege of 
choosing whether to do so. IdL; State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997). 
The chief policy supporting the privilege is to foster ,fthe harmony and sanctity of 
the marriage relationship." Trammel 445 U.S. at 44. Allowing a spouse to choose 
whether to testify avoids placing the spouse "in the unenviable position of either 
committing perjury or testifying to matters that are detrimental to his or her spouse, which 
could clearly lead to marital strife." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1227. The privilege also 
avoids "the 'natural repugnance in every fair-minded person to compelling a wife or 
husband to be the means of the other's condemnation.'" Id. (quoting 8 John H. Wigmore, 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2228 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
Most states have established some form of the privilege by statute, court rule or 
judicial decision. Despite the privilege, several of these jurisdictions allow the State to 
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admit a spouse's hearsay statements even when the spouse chooses not to testify. See, 
e.g., Statev.DeWitt, 433 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). These jurisdictions 
only bar actual testimony. Id. 
In contrast, Utah protects the spousal right not to tesify under its constitution. 
Utah is the only jurisdiction in the country that not only establishes a statutory privilege 
for spouses not to testify, but also deems the privilege as so important as to create a 
constitutional right against compelled spousal testimony. Utah's constitutional framers 
"enshrined" this right in the constitution in response to the federal government's practice 
of imprisoning and fining polygamous wives for their refusal to testify against their 
husbands. Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary 
Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UtahL. Rev. 751, 816-17, 820 
n.431. In numerous instances, the federal government imprisoned wives and their babies 
for several months. Edwin B. Firmage & Richard C. Mangrum, Zion in the Courts: A 
Legal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1830-1900 at 138, 167, 
149-50, 205-09. (1988). The risk of imprisonment created the "cruel dilemma" for wives 
of testifying and sending their husbands to prison or being sent to prison themselves. 
Recognizing the potential for disrupting families and creating marital strife, the 
framers of the Utah Constitution included the spousal right not to testify in the 
Declaration of Rights. Cassell, supra at 820 n.431. According to the chairperson of the 
committee that drafted the Declaration, the committee included all those rights "which a 
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free and enlightened people, who have been too long kept in territorial bondage, have the 
right to expect." Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention for 
the Constitution of the State of Utah at 200 (1989). The framers, thus, considered the 
spousal right not to testify as fundamental and essential. 
Admitting a spouse's statements at trial through a third party undermines this right 
just as if the spouse had testified. When a spouse invokes the right not to testify, 
presumably that spouse does so with the design of promoting marital harmony and 
preserving the relationship. But, when the State skirts around the right and admits a 
spouse's incriminating statements through a third-party, marital harmony suffers just as if 
the spouse had testified. Whether the incriminating evidence comes from the spouse or 
through another, the source of the damaging information remains the same. In either 
case, the witness spouse reveals information that may convict and possibly imprison the 
defendant spouse. 
Admitting a spouse's statements through another has the same effect as compelling 
the spouse to testify. Even though the spouse does not actually testify, the concerns for 
marital harmony and dissension remain. Not only will the defendant spouse likely harbor 
ill feelings against the witness spouse, but the witness spouse may also resent being the 
source of incriminating information. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1227. The admission of the 
spouse's statements, even if the spouse asserts the right not to testify, may also cause the 
spouse to rethink the decision not to testify. In that situation, the witness spouse is placed 
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anew in the "unenviable position of either committing perjury or testifying to matters that 
are detrimental to his or her spouse, which could clearly lead to marital strife." Id at 
1227. 
This case vividly illustrates these concerns. Ms. Gallegos' statements established 
the only evidence that Mr. Webster took the car without permission. This evidence 
provided substantive evidence of guilt and directly led to Mr. Webster's conviction. 
Given the damage Ms. Gallegos' statements caused Mr. Webster, it takes little effort to 
imagine the strife that the statements likely injected into their marriage. 
The Utah Supreme Court implicitly recognized this potential for marital 
dissension. In State v. Carter. 888 P.2d P.2d 629 (Utah), cert, denied 516 U.S. 858 
(1995), the Court considered whether the police may use a spouse's statements to 
investigate a crime which the police suspect that the other spouse has committed. There, 
the Court ruled that the marital privilege does not ff'prevent[ ] the Government from 
enlisting one spouse to give information concerning the other or to aid in the other's 
apprehension. It is only the spouse's testimony in the courtroom that is prohibited.'" Id 
at 638-39 (quoting Trammel v. United States. 445 U.S. 40, 52 n.12 (1980)) (fn. omitted). 
The Court added, however, that the State could only use such information to investigate a 
crime if "the witness spouse's statement is not introduced into evidence at trial over the 
objections of the accused spouse." IcL at 639. In that case, the State did not appear to 
have admitted the wife's statements but only used them to investigate the case. 
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In barring the State from presenting a spouse's statements at trial, the Court 
implicitly recognized that it is the admission of the spouse's statements themselves that 
undermines marital harmony, not the spouse's act of testifying. This concern for 
preserving marriages bars courts from admitting a spouse's statements incriminating the 
other spouse. Because the trial judge violated this constitutional provision in admitting 
Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements, reversal is required. 
II. THE ADMISSION OF AN UNCONNECTED PRIOR 
OFFENSE THAT OCCURRED SEVEN YEARS 
PREVIOUSLY WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS CASE 
BUT, INSTEAD, SHOWED BAD CHARACTER AND 
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICED THE JURY 
Like the erroneous admission of the hearsay evidence, the trial judge abused his 
discretion in admitting evidence of a prior offense. See State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, f^ 
18, 993 P.2d 837 (applying abuse of discretion standard of review). Mr. Webster's prior 
offense in Virginia had no connection to the matter below and it occurred seven years 
previously when Mr. Webster was 18 years old. That incident simply served to bias the 
jury against Mr. Webster. 
"It is fundamental to our law that a person may be convicted criminally only for 
his acts, not for his general character . . . or propensity to commit bad acts." State v. 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^ f 15, 992 P.2d 951. Because "prior crimes may have such a 
powerful tendency to mislead the finder of fact," such evidence has limited admissibility. 
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Id. Under Rule of Evidence 404(b), the trial court may only admit evidence of prior bad 
acts for "noncharacter purpose[s]" such as motive, intent, common plan, or absence of 
mistake. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, f 21, 993 P.2d 837; Addendum H. 
Given the tremendous potential for confusing the jury, "admission of prior crimes 
evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges." Id. at f 18. The trial 
judge failed to do so here. The trial judge admitted the prior offense based on defense 
counsel's claim during opening statements that the State could not identify who stole the 
car. R. 38: 93-94. But, once the trial judge admitted Ms. Gallegos' statements, identity 
was no longer at issue. Neither was intent or absence of mistake. The admission of Ms. 
Gallegos' statements, thus, obviated any need to admit the prior crime evidence. When 
the reasons for admitting evidence are not at issue, the trial court abuses its discretion in 
admitting such evidence. State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424, 430 (Utah 1989) (concluding 
trial judge "erred" in admitting prior crime evidence to show identity or intent when those 
issues not disputed). 
Should this Court conclude that Ms. Gallegos' statements were inadmissible and a 
new trial become necessary, the prior act still would not be admissible to prove identity. 
The trial judge failed to specify how evidence of a similar crime that occurred seven years 
previously shows that Mr. Webster committed this offense. According to the 
presentence report, the prior offense occurred in Virginia on June 18, 1991, when Mr. 
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Webster was 18 years old.. R. 54: 1, 5.5 The present matter arose on July 10, 1998. The 
trial judge below failed to even consider this time gap. 
The trial judge similarly failed to consider the circumstances surrounding the prior 
offense. When he admitted the statement, the judge only knew that Mr. Webster had been 
arrested in Virginia for "driving a vehicle off of a dealership lot." R. 38: 112. He did not 
inquire about whether the dealership employed Mr. Webster at the time of his arrest, the 
factual context when he took the car, or the disposition of the arrest. The trial judge's 
blanket acceptance of the evidence could hardly be considered a "scrupulous[] 
examination]." Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^  18, 993 P.2d 837. 
Even if the trial judge had considered the details of the prior offense, the 
remoteness of that incident renders it of little probative value in establishing identity. 
Had the events occurred more closely together, perhaps the Virginia offense may have 
indicated some likelihood that Mr. Webster was the same person who committed both 
offenses. But, when the events occurred far apart, that offense offered the jury little use 
in establishing identity. Instead, it simply communicated to the jury a propensity to 
commit similar crimes. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, % 15, 992 P.2d 951. 
The stale Virginia conviction similarly failed to address intent or absence of 
mistake. To be admissible, a prior act must have "'clearly probative value with respect to 
5The volume marked "R. 54" contains the presentence report. The internal page 
numbers of that volume follow the volume number. 
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the intent of the accused at the time of the offense charged.9" State v. Featherson. 781 
P.2d 424, 430 (Utah 1989) (quoting United States v. Scott. 701 F.2d 1340, 1345-46 (11th 
Cir.), cert, denied 464 U.S. 856 (1983)) (emphasis in original) (original citation omitted). 
This Court has concluded that offenses committed far more closely in time were still too 
remote to show the defendant's intent in the present case. In State v. Cox. 787 P.2d 4, 5 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), the State accused the defendant of rape. After the defendant's 
arrest, two women reported to police that the defendant had raped them two years 
previously. Id The trial judge allowed both women to testify over the defendant's 
objections. Id. This Court concluded that the two prior rapes were "too remote in time to 
the crime charged . . . [because] [t]here [wa]s no apparent connection between 
defendant's earlier conduct and his intent" in the present situation. Id. at 6. 
Like the prior offenses in Cox. Mr. Webster previously committed a similar 
offense. But, that crime was totally unconnected to this matter and does not address his 
intent below. It not only occurred seven years previously but it happened on the opposite 
side of the country. 
Even if the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the prior 
conviction, the trial judge erred in concluding that the probative value of the evidence 
outweighed its potential for prejudice. State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, % 23, 993 P.2d 837. 
In weighing the probative value and the potential for prejudice., courts consider several 
factors: 
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f,[A] variety of matters must be considered, including the 
strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, 
the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has 
elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the 
efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility." 
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on 
Evidence § 190 at 565 (3d Ed. 1984)). 
As discussed above, the significant time gap between the offenses diminished the 
probative value of the prior conviction. In addition, the similarities between the facts 
below and the prior offense created a "powerful tendency to mislead the trier of fact." 
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ^  15, 992 P.2d 951. Although the State presented no details about 
the Virginia offense, that evidence obviously implied that Mr. Webster had committed the 
same crime before. In fact, the similarities between the crimes may explain why the 
prosecutor only admitted Officer Cupello's statements rather than seeking actual evidence 
of the crime itself. The only logical and virtually inescapable inference the jury could 
have drawn from the admission of this near identical crime was that Mr. Webster 
committed both crimes. 
The admission of the Virginia offense particularly packs a punch if this Court 
properly eliminates Ms. Gallegos' hearsay statements from the State's case. No physical 
evidence linked Mr. Webster to the car and no other witnesses saw him with it near the 
time the car was reported missing. Given the absence of evidence of guilt, the admission 
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a similar crime would simply invite the jury to convict Mr. Webster based on his prior 
offense. The potential for prejudice is too great to allow the jury to hear the evidence. 
III. BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE FAILED TO SPECIFY 
THE PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME OF WRONGFUL 
APPROPRIATION, UTAH LAW IMPOSED AN 
INFRACTION, OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, THE RULE 
OF LENITY REQUIRED THE TRIAL JUDGE TO 
IMPOSE A MISDEMEANOR 
The trial judge erroneously sentenced Mr. Webster to a third degree felony. 
Because the legislature had repealed the statute that listed the penalty for Mr. Webster's 
particular offense, Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-105(2) (1999) required the trial 
judge to impose an infraction. The rule of lenity and the prohibition against ex post facto 
laws also demand this result. The most the trial judge should have imposed was an A 
misdemeanor under the former statute. 
As a threshold matter, the trial judge erroneously imposed a sentence ffone degree 
lower" than theft as provided under subsection 3(a) of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-
404.5. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5 (Supp. 1998); Addendum B. The record establishes 
that the jury specifically convicted Mr. Webster under subsection 3(e) for "an act of 
unauthorized control of [a] motor vehicle[]." The State charged Mr. Webster in the 
information with misappropriating a "motor vehicle." R. 1. Likewise, the jury was 
specifically instructed that to convict Mr. Webster of wrongful appropriation, it had to 
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find that he exercised unauthorized control over a "motor vehicle." R. 29.5. Thus, the 
jury had to specifically find, as an element to the offense, that Mr. Webster took a vehicle. 
Contrary to the jury instructions and the jury's verdict, the trial judge reasoned that 
because the State had charged Mr. Webster with a second degree felony under section 76-
6-412, subsection 3(a) of section 76-6-404.5 imposed a third degree felony. The trial 
judge failed to recognize that subsection 3(e) of section 76-6-404.5 specified that "an act 
of unauthorized control of [a] motor vehicle[]... is punishable under Utah Code 
Annotated section 41-la-1311." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(e) (Supp. 1998). 
Instead, the trial judge concluded that subsection 3(e) did not apply to Mr. Webster 
because that provision applied to "unauthorized control" of a motor vehicle rather than 
wrongfully appropriating a vehicle. R. 53: 13-14. The trial judge further failed to realize 
that section 76-6-404.5 defines the crime of wrongful appropriation as exercising 
"unauthorized control" over property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(1) (1999). The term 
"unauthorized control" is simply an element of the crime of wrongful appropriation. The 
trial judge's mistake is understandable because he admitted at sentencing that he had not 
read the defense motion to clarify the sentence. R. 53: 5. 
Rules of statutory construction required the trial judge to sentence Mr. Webster 
under subsection 3(e). In construing statutes, "a more specific provision always takes 
precedence over a more general provision." State v. Hinson. 966 P.2d 273, 277 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1998). The trial judge's reliance on section 76-6-412 was misplaced because that 
statute lists various punishments for theft depending on the type and value of the property 
taken. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1999). Contrary to those general provisions, 
subsection 3(e) specifically applied to "an act of unauthorized control of [a] motor 
vehicle[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.5(3)(e) (Supp. 1998). Thus, under the rules of 
statutory construction, subsection 3(e) controlled. 
However, at the time of Mr. Webster's offense, the legislature had not specified 
the punishment under subsection 3(e). Effective May 4, 1998, two months prior to Mr. 
Webster's offense, the legislature repealed Utah Code Annotated section 41-la-1311, the 
statute referred to in subsection 3(e) that listed the penalty. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-
1311 (1998); Addendum D. Accordingly, at the time of Mr. Webster's offense, the 
legislature had failed to specify the punishment for his crime. 
The legislature has provided a remedy when it fails to specify the penalty for an 
offense. Under Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-105(2) (1999), "any offense defined 
outside this code which is not designated as a felony or a misdemeanor and for which no 
penalty is specified is an infraction." Thus, by default, the legislature punished wrongful 
appropriation of a vehicle as an infraction. 
The rule of lenity in criminal cases agrees. It is well-settled that "in case of doubt 
or uncertainty as to the degree of crime, [the accused] is entitled to the lesser.'" State v. 
Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334, 
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336 (Utah 1971)). Given the uncertainty surrounding the punishment under subsection 
3(e), the trial judge was required to impose the least possible punishment. 
The constitutional prohibition against ex post fact laws lends further support to this 
conclusion. Utah Const, art. I, § 18; U.S. Const, art. I, § 9, cl. 3. An amendment to a 
sentencing statute violates the ban against ex post facto laws if it makes the punishment 
for a crime more "'burdensome'" after the crime is committed. State v. Dominguez, 1999 
UT App. 343, TJ12, 992 P.2d 995 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida. 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977)). 
In this case, the punishment under subsection 3(e) was, by default, an infraction. But, at 
the time of sentencing, the legislature had repealed subsection 3(e). Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404.5 (1999). Instead, the unauthorized use of a vehicle was punishable as a third 
degree felony either under section 76-6-404.5(3)(a) or under Utah Code Annotated 
section 41-1 a-1314 (1998), commonly referred to as the "joyriding statute." This 
increased punishment, thus, created an ex post facto law. 
At the very least, the trial judge could have only sentenced Mr. Webster for an A 
misdemeanor. Prior to its repeal, section 41-1 a-1311 imposed an A misdemeanor for 
unauthorized use of a vehicle. Because the legislature had failed to specify the 
punishment for Mr. Webster's crime, the trial judge could have reasonably applied the 
former punishment. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Webster's conviction and remand for a new trial, or 
in the alternative, vacate his sentence and order the trial judge to impose an infraction. 
^ 
Dated this J_ day of May, 2000. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH J WEBSTER, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
MO: TO CLARIFY DEGREE/CHARGE 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 981201411 FS 
Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Date: August 24, 1999 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lindav 
Prosecutor: HIGGINS, TRINA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): HEINEMAN, ROBERT K 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 19, 1972 
Audio 
Tape Number: 99 441 Tape Count: 4410 
CHARGES 
2. WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION - 3rd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 04/29/1999 Guilty 
HEARING 
DEFT MAKES MOTION TO COURT. 
COUNT: 4600 
STATE REBUTTAL 
COUNT: 5530 
COURT ORDERED DEFT WAS CONVICTED OF A THIRD DEGREE FELONY. 
Paae i SC 
Case No: 981201411 
Date: Aug 24, 1999 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 165 day(s). 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 2 Fine: $750.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $344.59 
Due: $750.00 
Total Fine: $750.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $344.59 
Total Principal Due: $750.00 
Plus Interest 
The fine is to be paid in full by September 30, 2000. 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
$75.00 PER MONTH BEGINNING 9/30/99 
Complete 120 hour(s) of community service in lieu of 15 days in 
jail. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $200.00 Plus Inteirest 
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Murray District Court. 
Defendant to serve 15 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 750.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine on or before September 30, 2000. 
Page 2 57 
Case No: 981201411 
Date: Aug 24, 1999 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Pay fines and fees as agreed 
No Violations of the Law 
Evaluation and Treatment as deemed necessary. 
NO RESTITUTION DUE ON THIS CASE. 
COURT ORDERED 120 HOURS COMMUNITY SERVICE IN LIEU OF 15 DAYS JAIL. 
TO BE COMPLETED AT 20 HOURS PER MONTH AND COMPLETED BY 2/28/2000 
COURT ORDERED DEFT TO COMPLETE COGNITIVE RESTRUCTURING 
CLASS/COUNSELING THROUGH VALLEY MENTAL HEALTH. 
DEFT TO NOT BE EMPLOYED BY A CAR DEALERSHIP DURING PROBATION 
PERIOD. 
Dated th i s A*f day of / ^ y ^ , 19?f . 
District* £gfurt*trudg^ 
r
.
:j£? i:'.'?S*'% 
•7 
ss 
Paae 3 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
76-6-404.5- Wrongful appropriation — Penalties-
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent of the 
owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, 
or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of 
possession of the property. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control 
by the actor is not presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal 
custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the control of the property by any 
person. 
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as 
provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation which would have been: 
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a third degree felony if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a 
class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a class B misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a class C misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; and 
(e) an act of unauthorized control of motor vehicles, trailers, or semi-
trailers which does not constitute theft is punishable under Section 
41-la-131L 
(Supp. 1998) 
ADDENDUM C 
76-3-105. Infractions. 
(1) Infractions are not classified. 
(2) Any offense which is an infiraction within this code is expressly desig-
nated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a 
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 
ADDENDUM D 
41-1*4311, 41-la-1312. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1998, ch. 315, § 2 repeals § unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers, 
41-la-1311, as renumbered and last amended or semitrailers, effective May 4, 1998. 
by L. 1992, ch. 1, § 168, concerning exercising 
41-la-1311. Unlawful control over motor vehicles, trailers, 
or semitrailers — Penalties — Effect of prior con-
sent — Accessory or accomplice* 
(1) It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control 
over a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the consent of 
the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to temporarily deprive the 
owner or lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to 
the control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a differ-
ent person. 
(3) Any person who assists in, or is a party or accessory to or an accomplice 
in, an unauthorized taking or driving is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 46, § 100; 1941, ch. 
50, § 1; 1941 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, § 1; C. 1943, 
57-3a-110; L. 1983, ch. 190, § 2; 1986, ch. 32, 
§ 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 52; C. 1953, 41-1-109; re-
numbered by L. 1992, ch. 1, § 168. 
Amendment Notes. —- The 1992 amend-
ment, effective January 30, 1992, renumbered 
this section, which formerly appeared as 
§ 41-1-109: substituted "motor vehicle, trailer, 
or semitrailer" for "vehicle" in three places; de-
leted former Subsection (2) which made an of-
fense under the section a third-degree felony if 
the vehicle was not returned within 24 hours; 
redesignated former Subsections (3) and (4) as 
Subsections (2) and (3); and made stylistic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
ADDENDUM E 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages, 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 
76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000; 
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, 
or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony, the property 
taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, 
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal 
raised for commercial purposes; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 76-6-413, or 
commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6-412(l)(b)(iii), is civilly 
liable for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, and for costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
ADDENDUM F 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
ADDENDUM G 
Art. I, § 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
ADDENDUM H 
Rule 404 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefiilness of the victim offered by 
the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the 
first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this 
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.) 
ADDENDUM I 
76-6-404.5. Wrongful appropriation — Penalties. 
(1) A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the consent of the 
owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, 
or use the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of 
possession of the property. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of the property to its control 
by the actor is not presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal 
custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the control of the property by any 
person. 
(3) Wrongful appropriation is punishable one degree lower than theft, as 
provided in Section 76-6-412, so that a violation which would have been: 
(a) a second degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a third degree felony if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(b) a third degree felony under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is a 
class A misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; 
(c) a class A misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a class B misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation; and 
(d) a class B misdemeanor under Section 76-6-412 if it had been theft is 
a class C misdemeanor if it is wrongful appropriation. 
(1999) 
ADDENDUM J 
Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable* 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situ-
ations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or 
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's state-
ment has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other 
reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim 
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdo-
ing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing 
the witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of 
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with 
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor 
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action 
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the 
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or 
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in 
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it 
to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the 
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by 
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal 
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing 
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the 
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the 
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the 
matter declared. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the genera] purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
.Advisory Committee Note. — Subdivision former rule is broader to the extent that it did 
(a) is comparable to Rule 63(7) [Rule 62(7)], not limit the admission of the testimony to a 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Rule 62(7)[(e)j, situation where the party to the action had the 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), seems to be interest and opportunity to develop the testi-
encompassed in Rule 804(a)(5). Subdivision mony. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 
(a)(5) is a modification of the federal rule which 1980); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 
permits judicial discretion to be applied in 1981). 
determining unavailability of a witness. ~ Subdivision (b)(2) is comparable to Rule 
Subdivision (b)(1) is comparable to Rule 63(5), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the 
63(3), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rule was not limited to declarations 
ADDENDUM K 
41-la-1314L Unauthorized control for extended time. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), it is a class A misdemeanor for a 
person to exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer, not his own, without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian, 
and with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of 
possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer to its control by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent on a previous occasion to the 
control of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a different 
person. 
(3) Violation of this section is a third degree felony if: 
(a) the person does not return the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer 
to the owner or lawful custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of 
unlawful control; or 
(b) regardless of the mental state or conduct of the person committing 
the offense: 
(i) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is damaged in an 
amount of $500 or more; 
(ii) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is used to commit a 
felony; or 
(iii) the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer is damaged in any 
amount to facilitate entry into it or its operation. 
(4) It is not a defense to Subsection (3)(a) that someone other than the 
person, or an agent of the person, returned the motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer within 24 hours. 
ADDENDUM L 
Art. I, § 18 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing con-
tracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of 
contracts shall be passed. 
ADDENDUM M 
Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Sec. 9. [Powers denied Congress.] 
[1.] The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now 
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress 
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may 
be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. 
[2.] The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, un-
less when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. 
[3.] No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. 
[4.] No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid unless in Proportion to 
the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken. 
[5.] No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. 
[6.] No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce of Reve-
nue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, 
or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another. 
[7.] No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the 
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to 
time. 
[8.] No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: and no 
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the 
Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of 
any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State. 
